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BASIC ELEMENTS OF NAVAL LOGISTICS 
A lecture delivered by 
Captain H. E. Eccles, U. S. N. 
at the Naval War College 
September 8, 1949 
Napoleon's Russian campaign is the classic example of mili­
tary disaster caused by the failure properly to estimate the logis­
tic situation. Two striking examples of military defeat caused by a 
breakdown or interruption of logistic support are found in the fall 
of the Confederacy and in Rommel's North African campaign. 
In World War II we have recently seen two examples of suc­
cess built on the foundation of a vast trans-oceanic logistic system, 
Eisenhower's European campaign and the war in the Pacific. In 
each case unremitting pressure was made possible by a successful 
logistic support system. Many more examples can be cited to show 
the place of logistics in warfare, but none should be necessary. 
For the last hundred and fifty years there has been a steady 
increase in fire power of all combat units. This, of course, requires 
an increase in the amount of logistic support required to maintain 
one combat soldier or sailor in the war zone. The present acceleration 
of this trend emphasizes the continuing need for a greater logistic 
efficiency and better understanding of the problem. There are two 
ways in which a logistic support system can break down: one, of 
course, is by enemy action, and the other is by its own inefficiency. 
Regardless of the cause of such breakdown, the result is always the 
same; it· is always a marked decrease in combat effectiveness. 
This discussion is not concerned with the strategy and tac .. 
tic� required to cut an enemy's lines of transport and supply. Rather 
it is concerned with a discussion of logistic efficiency. In World War 
Captain Eccles is a member of the Naval War College Staff. 
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II, in spite of much waste and inefficiency, our logistic support sys­
tems worked. This, however, should not lead us to assume that a sim­
ilar method will be satisfactory in a future war. 
The basic situation under which we will fight will probably be 
entirely different: we shall have to fight in an economy of relative 
scarcity as opposed to the economy of plenty in which we fought 
most of World War II. In case of another war the United States 
will have to be prepared to undertake extensive overseas opera­
tions immediately upon the outbreak of war. We will not have the 
time to build up behind the screen of a so called "phoney war" and 
strong allies before we become actively engaged in combat. Also it 
is quite likely that the industrial plant of the continental United 
States will be physically damaged by enemy action. The extent of 
this damage is, of course, impossible to predict but extensive damage 
can easily be caused by long-range air bombardment, guided missiles 
launched from enemy submarines, or sabotage. Finally, the improve­
ments in modern submarines pose an increasing threat to our lines 
of communications to our overseas forces and may have a serious 
effect on our imports of strategic raw materials. Because of. these 
conditions we must search out every means of increasing our 
logistic efficiency. 
As we look at the history of various engineering develop­
ments we find that in each instance major advances in efficiency have 
been based upon an increased knowledge of theory and principle. In 
1903 Wilbur and Orville Wright, while they knew very little about 
the theory and principle of aerodynamics, were able to build an air­
plane that flew. However, the progress from 1903 to 1949 in both 
the internal combustion engine and the airplane itself have both 
been based primarily on an increased knowledge of the theories and 
principles of engineering and aerodynamics. And so it behooves us 
to seek an understanding of logistic theory and principle in order 
that we may improve our logistic efficiency. 
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First comes the question of the definition of Logistics. Just 
what is Logistics? There are many definitions, some of them quite 
long and detailed. For example, there is the definition given by 
Doctor Duncan S., Ballantine in his book, "U. S. Naval Logistics 
in the Second World War'': 
"In its broadest definition the term logistics signifies 
the total process by which the resources of a nation-ma­
terial and human-are mobilized and directed toward the 
accomplishment of military ends. Officially naval logis­
tics has been defined as 'the supply of material and per­
sonnel, including the procurement, storage, distribution 
and transportation of material, and the procurement, 
housing, training, distribution and transportation of per­
sonnel together with the rendering of services to Naval 
operating forces'." 
The JCS definition currently effective is: 
"That part of the entire military activity which deals 
with production, procurement, storage, transportation, 
distribution, maintenance and evacuation of personnel, 
supplies and equipment; with induction, classification, as­
signment, welfare and separation of personnel; and with 
facilities required for the support of the military establish­
ment including construction and operation thereof. It com­
prises both planning and implementation." 
In my opinion neither of these definitions is wholly satis­
factory for our purpose of developing theory and principle, and 
therefore I offer instead a very broad general definition which has 
been derived from Colonel Thorpe's excellent little book "Pure 
Logistics", published in 1917: 
"Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the conduct 
of military operations; Logistics provides the means there­
for." 
In amplification of this we may consider that the means 
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for the conduct of military operations are MEN, MATERIALS 
and SERVICES. 
Within the framework of this broad definition all the other 
more exact and precise definitions can be included. Furthermore, 
this broad, simple definition has the great advantage of relat­
ing Strategy,Tactics and Logistics. 
In order to understand the importance of this relationship 
let me digress a moment. In the study of war we are interested in 
reality rather than in mere words; and, while words are necessary 
for us to formulate and exchange ideas, yet we must never feel that 
words in themselves have any reality. They are merely symbols and 
regardless of what symbols we use to express our formulation of 
this complex reality that we call war, the words themselves are 
merely the symbols or the means of conveying these ideas. In 
dealing with a reality which is as complex as modern war it is 
understandable that what any particular individual sees will de­
pend very largely on his point of view. That is not a new thing 
because all through human life various people will look at the same 
thing and yet will give a different interpretation of the reality that 
they see in that object. In some instances the differences resulting 
from differences in point of view will be very marked; in other 
cases they may be minor, but differences always exist. F,or ex­
ample, if we consider medicine and anatomy, doctors look at the 
human being in different ways depending on their specialty. If, for 
example, we ask in succession a nerve specialist, an orthopedist, or 
an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist to discuss human nahtre, 
behavior and weakness, we will find that quite likely there will be 
three different points of view expressed. In medicine we have the 
advantage of many years of study in the development of a precise, 
scientific terminology, but even then the discussions of the same 
thing will vary as these three· specialists focus their attention on 
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different aspects of the same reality. We can easily realize that 
their difference fa point of view in no way affects the reality of 
human nature and behavior. 
And so as we look at war we each of us may see it in a 
different perspective. The strategist, the geopolitician, the logis­
tician and the economist will all tend to emphasize different but 
related aspects. In war we do not have a precise and exact scientific 
language with which to express our ideas. In war we are dealing 
with many intangibles, intangibles of the human mind and the 
human spirit, and we are not in a position where we can make 
precise and controlled scientific experiments to further our 
knowledge of war. Therefore, we must expect that our four differ­
ent points of view will produce four very different discussions of war. 
As we study war we find more and more that it is neces­
sary to develop broad and comprehensive understanding. Breadth of 
understanding implies understanding of the other man's point of 
view. The fact that we may have very different points of 
view in our discussions of war does not in any sense imply that 
war itself is different or that the difference in the way two in­
dividuals express their concepts of war indicate that one is wholly 
correct and the other incorrect. 
A useful illustration of how logistics, economics and war are 
related is found in a sentence from a recent Munitions Board 
presentation: 
"The logistic process is at one and the same time the 
military element in the nation's economy and the economic 
element in its military operations." 
The understanding of any complex entity or subject re­
quires a study of its structure. I consider that Logistics has a 
definite structure, that a knowledge of this structure is essential 
to a knowledge of the nature of Logistics and its relationship to 
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war, and I believe that substantial agreement as to . this structure 
will be required before we can go very far in developing sound 
theories and principles of Logistics. So I off er the following formula­
tion of structure for your consideration and criticism. Logistics is 
composed of fundamental elements and basic aspects. I consider 
that the fundamental elements are: The Determination of Require­
ments, Procurement and Distribution; the Basic Aspects are Organi­
tion, Planning, Execution and Supervision. No matter what our task . 
may be in Logistics we will find these elements and aspects, and 
these elements and aspects blend and overlap in a manner which 
varies greatly according to circumstances. Every logistic problem 
starts with the determination of requirements; the next step is 
the procurement of these requirements; the final step is their dis­
tribution. No matter what element we are dealing with we must 
organize, plan, execute and supervise. 
Taking up our basic elements let us first consider require­
ments. The determination of requirements is considered to be part 
of "consumer logistics", and as such is under military control. There 
are many factors in the determination of requirements, but the 
most important in my opinion are six in number. In the first place, 
all logistic requirements to be realistic must stem from specific 
strategical and tactical plans. The questions are: What combat 
forces must we provide for? Where are they going to be operating? 
When are they going to be operating? And in what manner are 
they going to operate? The civilian economy is very important 
because our entire military machine is based on a sound civilian 
economy. If we permit this civilian economy to disintegrate, ulti­
mately this disintegration will spread with disastrous effects upon 
the combat forces. Therefore, in determining our national require­
ments we must be sure to provide for all the human and material 
needs of our civilian economy. This, of course, makes major addi­
tions to the demands upon our overseas shipping for the importation 
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of strategic materials. At the same time we must never forget that 
we have allies who must be supported, and that there are benevolent 
neutrals whose benevolence it pays us to insure by continued sup­
port to their economies. We should never forget that the military 
government of the occupied areas makes further imperative logis­
tic demands and we must provide for them. In World War II we 
did not fully understand the necessity for this ; for instance, in 1943 
during the Italian Campaign the American Army operating in Italy 
was deprived of certain shipments of ammunition because the am­
munition that had been scheduled to sail was cancelled in order to 
provide room for wheat for the civilian population of Italy. In the 
latter part of the war we overcame this deficiency and planned 
for our military government needs, but it was most embarrassing to 
the combat forces to find that ammunition had to yield to civilian 
food. 
In all estimates of requirements we must ascertain the state 
of our resources in pernonnel, material, weapons and facilities, 
and correlate our data to arrive at the final estimates. 
It is only when we have made this complete determination 
of requirements and compared it with the state of our resources 
. 
. 
that we are in a position to determine the manner in which logistic 
considerations may limit our strategical and tactical plans. 
Next in the· field of fundamental elements is the question 
of procurement. This comes under the heading of "producer logis­
tics" and is generally under civilian control. Military procurement 
is based primarily on industrial mobilization, which is the orderly 
coordinated mobilization of all material and human resources of the 
nation for the most effective conduct of war. It requires expansion 
and establishment of production facilities, major conversion of pro­
duction facilities, a very high degree of planning, and the formula-
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tion and issuance of preliminary educational contracts which ex­
tend into actual trial production. Furthermore, industrial mobiliza­
tion must always include consideration of the mobilization and al­
location of manpower to industry. The Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces is a splendid institution which is primarily concerned 
with the study of industrial mobilization. In all matters of pro­
curement we must at all times be fully conscious of the implica­
tions of lead time. Lead time may be defined as "the interval be­
tween the time of the decision to provide an item to the combat 
forces and the time such an item is delivered to these forces in 
adequate quantity and in reliable operating condition for use against 
the enemy." The reliable operating condition means that there is an 
adequate supply of trained personnel both for operation and main­
tenance. This question of lead time enters into almost every logis­
tic problem that can arise in war, and its understanding is a 
matter of the most urgent importance to all officers. Lead time 
may vary from a few hours in the case of certain reserve ma­
terials which are in ready supply in the combat areas, to five or 
ten years for new types of ships or planes or other complex equip­
ment. 
The provision of reliable operating and maintenance per­
sonnel and spare parts is a very important factor in lead time. For 
example, in 1945 the Navy undergoing Kamikaze attacks off Oki­
nawa was very much interested in obtaining airborne early warning 
radar. The Navy Department had developed and tested an airborne 
early warning system and yet the department refused to send it to 
the forward areas. That decision was perfectly correct because 
had this system been sent forward it would have been no real pro­
tection; rather it would have been a delusion or false protection, 
because at that time we did not have the personnel or know how 
to maintain it in reliable operating condition. 
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There is a further but narrower definition of lead time which 
is also important, and in this meaning it indicates the length of time 
necessary to package, ship and deliver to the combat forces ma­
terials which are in ready supply in the zone of the interior. 
We come next to the element of distribution. Distribution 
is part of "consumer logistics" and it is primarily under military 
control. Distribution picks up where procurement leaves off and in 
this pick up there is a very high degree of overlap. Distribution 
normally extends from the depots and warehouses in the con­
tinental United States thoughout the entire combat area up to the 
point where the bullet is placed in the gun or the beans in the mess 
kit of the ultimate consumer. 
Transportation and distribution are almost synonomous. In 
this connection it is always well to remember that transportation 
must be responsive to the needs of the combat command. Again, 
lead time is important. The narrower definition of lead time given 
previously applies primarily to distribution. 
Having discussed very briefly the fundamental elements we 
will now take a look at the basic aspects. First, as to organization­
logistic organizations are large, complex and in many instances 
controversial. It is interesting to note that many of the con­
troversies that existed in the Army in the period in which the gen­
eral staff was developing had their roots in the logistic problems. 
Many of the arguments that are now taking place in Washington 
within and among the three services stem from logistic causes. 
In actual size our logistic organizations are much larger than 
our combat organizations, and therefore no discussion of logistics 
can in any way be complete without consideration of organization. 
Organization is not a dead or static thing. Organization is a living 
thing, and as such it must be constantly re-examined and revised 
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as circumstances dictate. In spite of the tremendous variety of 
good organizations that exist there is usually found in any good 
organization an adherence to sound and well understood principles. 
If we are to depart from these principles (and such departure is 
frequently warranted), we should do it with an awareness that we 
are violating a principle rather than do it out of ignorance. Every 
time you violate a principle of organization you pay a price; some­
times the payment of that price is worthwhile, but not always. 
The commander of any force is always responsible for the 
organization of his force and our commanders should be constant­
ly aware of the urgent necessity for maintaining our peacetime or­
ganizations in such form that there can be a swift transition from 
peace to war without changing the essential structure of the organi­
zation. Peacetime logistics are relatively simple; in war they are 
very complex. If for the sake of immediate economy we allow our 
peacetime organizations to take a form which is unsuited for war, 
when war comes, the commander himself will have to revise that 
organization, and such revision will greatly intrude on the time 
that he would greatly pref er to devote to strategic and tactical 
problems of the most urgent nature. 
When we consider the question of logistic planning we must 
recognize the fundamental principle that strategic and logistical 
planning are inseparable. No logistic plan has any value unless it is 
based on the specific strategic plan, and no strategic plan has any 
value unless it can be logistically supported. 
The always present factor of lead time makes concurrent 
planning mandatory. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now so im­
pressed with the necessity for this concurrent strategic and logis­
tical planning that in their forthcoming "Joint Action Armed 
Forces" they propose to say that strategic and logistical planning 
must be concurrent and must precede tactical planning. 
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The :final aspects are execution and supervision. Actually, 
it is hard to make an accurate distinction between these two, and 
therefore they will be considered together. It is well to remember 
that a good plan, well executed, is better than a perfect plan poorly 
executed. Therefore, we should not seek too much perfection in our 
plans, but should sometimes be prepared to say "Let well enough 
alone" and proceed with the execution in spite of known imper­
fections. In this connection let us remember the fact that a 
logistic plan in wartime acquires great actual physical momentum. 
A major operation requires the movement of hundreds of 
thousands of tons of material extending over many months and over 
many thousands of miles of land and sea. While it may be possi­
ble with good and flexible planning to change the direction or 
somewhat modify the timing of an offensive operation, it is very 
difficult to reverse its flow. 
Perfection in planning can never be a substitute for imagina­
tion, initiative, judgment and determination in the execution of 
the plan. 
Continued progress in planning and in the execution of plans 
will depend upon the analysis of results. In other words, logistic 
operations require the same careful analysis and supervision of the 
planned action as do purely combat operations. 
Let us pass from the broad general view of Logistics to 
consideration of Navy Logistics. You are all familiar with the 
present organization of the Navy. It is excellently portrayed in the 
pamphlet "The United States Navy", published by the executive 
office of the Secretary in 1948. If we examine the description and 
discussion therein we :find that through the Civilian Secretaries 
and the Bureau system there is a high degree of civilian control of 
"Producer Logistics". And we :find that through the Chief of Naval 
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Operations, the Frontier, District and Fleet Commanders there is 
military control of "Consumer Logistics". 
All Naval planning stems from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the Chief of Naval Operations and is in three general groups. The 
first stage plans consist of statements of. missions and tasks. The 
second stage plans consist of the Basic Naval Establishment Plan, 
the Basic Mobilization Plans, the Basic Logistic Plan and the 
Strategic and Logistic Code plans. Finally, the third stage plans 
consist of the Supporting and Subsidiary Plans stemming from the 
Code Plans and the amplifying detailed plans prepared by the Com­
manders afloat and ashore who actually execute the plans. 
This excellent planning method which evolved out of the 
experience of World War II provides a flexible, decentralized sys­
tem which is in harmony with sound principles of organization and 
command. 
Thus, we have a sound National Defense Organization and a 
sound Naval Organization and Planning system as a basic structure 
through which Strategy, Logistics and Tactics can be harmoniously 
related. There remains the ever vital task of educating our offi� 
cers to understand and use the system . 
This sound basic support planning system is put into actual 
execution through four related types of Naval operating organiza­
tions. These are: The Continental Shore Establishment, The Ad­
vanced Shore Bases, The Floating Bases and The Mobile Logistic 
Support Forces and Groups. It is through these organizations that 
the Naval Supply System distributes to the fleet the myriad of ma­
terial supplies that are the lifeblood of our seagoing forces. It is 
through these organizations that the services and men are chan­
neled to the fleet. These organizations are linked and fed by trans­
portation systems both sea and air. And again for emphasis let me 
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remind you that transportation must be responsive to the needs of 
combat command. 
A successful offensive requires and acquires momentum. Suc­
cessful war is not a one-two punch, but rather a long succession 
of punches and the closer one punch follows the previous one the 
more the enemy is kept off balance, the less the losses of the at­
tacker and the greater the losses of the defender. This timing is 
vital and is determined primarily by logistic considerations. 
It is obvious that all fighting power ultimately rests upon 
logistic support which is derived from the land. Thus, while we 
recognize that ships are dependent upon the land, we must never 
forget that the fighting ship, more than any other military weapon, 
has within itself inherent mobility and a capacity for self­
sustenance. Hence, many combat operations can be conducted with 
the initial load of supplies that the ships themselves carry. How­
ever, sustained fighting power requires sustained support. This 
sustained support which gives real combat mobility to our Naval 
forces is provided through the coordination of our Shore Establish­
ment, Advanced and Floating Bases and our Mobile Logistic Support 
Forces. 
The use of the Task Force Type of Organization provides us 
with great flexibility; therefore, forces can be constituted, assigned 
missions and provided with adequate attached logistic support 
merely by a simple dispatch. 
We must never forget that the Fifth Fleet was able to fight 
off Okinawa for 90 days supported entirely by the Mobile Logistic 
Support Force, Service Squadron Six, and that it was this support 
that made that sustained fighting power possible. 
Summing up this greatly simplified discussion of basic Na val 
logistics, let me re-state my structural formulation. 
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Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of 
military operations; Logistics provides the means therefor. 
The means of war are Men, Materials and Services. The 
Fundamental Elements of Logistics are the Determination of Re­
quirements, Procurement and Distribution. 
The Basic Aspects are Organization, Planning, Execution 
and Supervision. In all cases these elements and aspects blend and 
overlap in a manner and degree which varies according to circum­
stances. When properly integrated with strategic and tactical con­
siderations they combine to form a sound and harmonious structure 
of flexible, mobile, and sustained fighting power. 
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